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In John Dewey and the Philosophy and Practice of Hope, Stephen M. Fishman, Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte, and Lucille McCarthy, Professor of English at the University of Maryland, join forces to experiment
with John Dewey's ideas in the classroom. They focus on the topic of hope, something they notice lacking in the world. Living in these dark times, they admit, wears
on their own confidence. Like many people over thirty years old, they came of age
during a time that encouraged optimism. Today, in contrast, evidence of growing
political and religious unrest, including war, widening gaps between rich and poor,
and perilous ecological conditions, despite our best and most reasoned efforts to
improve the world, often engenders a sense of despair. Failure can seem inevitable.
A significant problem becomes that of recovering and sustaining a sense of hope.
Fishman is determined to solve this problem by making "philosophy hit the
ground" (164). As McCarthy and he have demonstrated in earlier collaborations,
Fishman is comfortable making his classroom a laboratory to test ideas; his approach
to recovering hope is to design and teach a course on it. McCarthy, his partner, graciously returns in her role as sensitive, insightful, and articulate observer. Sympathetic to Fishman's challenges and dreams, she holds up a mirror to his teaching.
The two professors also return to John Dewey's works for inspiration. Fishman notes
Dewey's capacity to sustain hopefulness, even as he encountered difficult personal
and public losses. This leads Fishman to find in Dewey what he calls a "road map"
to a more enduring sense of hope. Moreover, Fishman wants to see if by taking his
course, students "might better understand and enhance their levels of hope" (xx).
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The book is divided into two parts, the first largely philosophical and the
second more practical. Fishman devotes the first chapter to presenting his theory
of "Deweyan hope." In the next three chapters, he compares and contrasts the set
of ideas constituting Deweyan hope with those from other scholars who have written on hope, including French existential philosopher Gabriel Marcel, Brazilian
educator Paulo Freire, and psychologist C. R. Snyder. Believing that "Dewey's voice
becomes clearer and more resonant when it is heard in dialogue with these other
voices" (xxiii), Fishman devotes a chapter to each individual, although throughout the text, he does not treat them as fully as he does Dewey. He concludes this
more theoretical part of the book with a chapter titled "Highlights of a Deweyan
Theory of Hope."
With an audience of teachers in mind, McCarthy then takes on most of
the second section, "The Practice of Hope," which comprises about a third of the
book. Here she makes the course come alive by reporting on her empirical study
of Fishman's upper-division course, "Philosophy and the Practice of Hope," which
he taught to ten undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte
during the spring of 2005. In chapter 6, "Teaching a Course on Hope," she explains
Fishman's seminarlike approach to engaging in collaborative inquiry, discusses the
aim of what she calls "constructed knowing," reports on the assignments, provides
portraits of the students, and recounts a class discussion. In addition to viewing
all the classes either directly or via videotape, McCarthy reflected with Fishman
on student work and conducted at least four interviews with almost every student.
In chapter 7, "Undergraduates in a Course on Hope," she reports on "ideas about
hope that the students were most able to use in their own lives" (105). She concludes her section with "Highlights of a Deweyan Practice of Hope." For the final
chapter of the book, Fishman and McCarthy reflect on their own collaborative
learning experience.
In constructing a theory of Deweyan hope, Fishman offers an idea he calls
"ultimate hope" or "living in hope." As he explains, "By living in hope, I mean having
an ultimate hope of goal towards which one works that gives one's life significance
in relation to nature and the human community. Living in hope means that one
has a sense of belonging, purpose, faith in one's ideals, and unification" (4). Fishman offers three Deweyan concepts he believes to be keys to "living in hope" and
achieving "ultimate hope." They are "gratitude," "intelligent wholeheartedness," and
"enriched present experience." He argues that embodying these concepts changes
our actions, making them more purposeful, unified, and significant because we are
able to glimpse their place in a larger and more meaningful context.
Gratitude, the first condition for living in hope, for example, goes well beyond simply feeling thankful. Through gratitude, according to Fishman, we play a
part in achieving a larger purpose. By fulfilling obligations to both our ancestors
and descendants, for instance, we experience the deeper sense of belonging to the
human community. Our charge is to find what is valuable in our inheritance. By
improving these goods, we make a positive difference for future generations.
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Wholeheartedness, according to Fishman, is not a case of simply being enthusiastically absorbed in an activity, loving what one is doing. To be considered
a key to living in hope, wholeheartedness must also be informed by intelligence.
"By choosing goals and ideals intelligently and wholeheartedly," Fishman explains,
"we give ourselves fully to them . . . even though we may meet with defeat as we attempt to realize them" (9). His belief in the value of his endeavors, Fishman testifies, "helps [him] better tolerate, accept, and even, at times, treasure [his] frequent
failure and disappointments" (10).
Fishman's third key to living in hope is what he calls "enriched present experience," that is, getting the most out of everyday experiences. Here he offers two
interrelated Deweyan ideas. First, we can make our present experience richer by
appreciating its connections to the past and the future. For example, we allow what
we want from the future to inform what we are doing because we see that the consequences of our actions will become conditions for future actions. Similarly, "we
experience present activity as a fulfillment" of what came before. Second, Fishman
argues that our capacity to become engrossed in present activity can be limited by
"too much focus on past successes and overanticipation of future ones" (12). He
explains, "Accepting that our successes and failures are intimately related and of
limited duration allows us to focus better on what is within our control" (12).
One of the delights of reading John Dewey and the Philosophy and Practice of
Hope is Fishman's ease in writing about Dewey. His prose reads like a conversation
with someone who not only knows Dewey's thinking well but also is not afraid
to experiment with these ideas. For example, Fishman is not daunted that Dewey
himself never chose to study hope. In fact, he testifies to eagerness "to see a little
further than Dewey saw by building on his insights, by constructing a theory of
hope that Dewey himself hints at but never explicitly develops" (165). Finding relevant passages in Dewey's work, however, demands careful reading, which Fishman
calls "patient sifting." He especially sifts through Dewey's more mature writings,
texts that Dewey wrote when he was past sixty and working through his ideas on
art and experience. These writings include Human Nature and Conduct (1922),
Experience and Nature (1925), the revised How We Think (1933), A Common Faith
(1934), and Art as Experience (1934). Dewey's aesthetic theory finds its way into
Fishman's thoughts on hope.
Right from the start Fishman makes clear that Dewey does not turn to religion
to find hope. Instead, he turns to nature. For Dewey, Fishman argues, the "impulse
to hope" is innate, in his words, "part of our animal 'pluck.'" As creatures living in
a world of change, Fishman explains, "our most basic goal is harmony among our
impulses and our environment. We want moments when we feel our needs have
been satisfied, when we feel peace within ourselves and in our relation to the universe" (16). Moreover, we can be fulfilled by the experience of actually achieving
harmony. Paraphrasing Dewey's claim from Art as Experience, Fishman writes,
"the moments of passage from disequilibrium to equilibrium are among those when
we are most alive and engaged, the moments of 'intensest life'" (16). The moments
E&C ◆ Education and Culture

Review: John Dewey and the Philosophy and Practice of Hope ◆ 69
of fulfillment nature provides, however, are short lived and unpredictable. Dewey
argues that by making the connection between the conditions and consequences
of our actions we apply intelligence to improving them. Intelligence allows us to
increase the frequency, depth, and duration of these moments. As we bring them
under our control, we can refine and enrich them.
According to Fishman, so it is with hope. "Humans have a native sense that
their activities will yield positive rather than negative results" (15), he explains. According to him, through the application of intelligence, hope, also, becomes refined
and enriched. In fact, it can become disciplined and eventually, moral. Hope becomes
disciplined when instead of just wanting something, we actually plan for it. Hope
becomes moral when we temper wholeheartedness with reason, making sacrifices
in order to serve a higher principle. Reasoned judgment "converts hopes that are
immediately attractive into hopes that are pronounced good or moral upon critical
reflection" (19). "Dewey's idea of living in hope," Fishman argues, "is that one's life is
undergirded by faith in an ultimate hope for this-worldly social reform" (4).
Fishman also admits that Dewey's theory of hope points to significant contradictions. He asks, "What is the object of Dewey's ultimate hope?" and gets two different
sets of answers. One set Fishman associates with what he calls the "familiar" Dewey
and the other with the "unfamiliar." The familiar Dewey is content with what nature
provides. His ultimate hope, according to Fishman, is "a life of challenge, creativity, and
cooperative democratic living" (21), each of which is possible in a changing world. By
applying intelligence, grasping the conditions leading to moments of fulfillment, we
can cause them to be more frequent but not more enduring. To Fishman, this means,
"the most I can hope for are moments in which I believe so strongly in the value of
what I am doing that I am vitally alive and fully engrossed. These are moments of
harmony that are limited in duration but that can help make the possibility of such
future moments, both for myself and for others, more widely available" (31).
Fishman also reports feeling "something mystical in [his] turn towards
Dewey" (30). He associates this feeling with the unfamiliar Dewey who describes
"experiences of the enveloping whole that are akin to the religious ecstasy of communion" (31). "These harmonies, and the resulting peace of mind, are so powerful
. . . that they endure for those who achieve them even through the darkest times"
(25). This unfamiliar Dewey also "suggests that peace beyond understanding, a
deep adjustment that lasts through all vicissitudes, is also a legitimate ultimate
hope"(31). Yearning for this ultimate hope, Fishman reports being discouraged
by Dewey's failure to provide a road map. Based on his reading of Dewey's Logic:
The Theory of Inquiry (1938), Fishman expects that "all inquiry should provide a
trail that others can follow to verify the inquirer's findings" (26). But, when Dewey
speaks of these experiences that sound mystical, he uses words such as "ineffable"
and "non-cognitive." Even so, in A Common Faith, as Fishman discovers, Dewey
says that "religious experiences yielding lasting and harmonious adjustments can
come about in three ways: philosophic reflection, poetry, and devotion to a cause"
(26). Fishman argues that all but devotion to a cause demand what he calls "negaVolume 25 (1) ◆ 2009
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tive capability," a term he borrows from Keats, "the capacity to entertain apparently contradictory positions without choosing one over the other" (27). Fishman
laments the challenge entailed in achieving this.
Fishman's candor must be one of the reasons his students enjoy taking his
classes. He sounds like the kind of professor many students would want to learn
from, regardless of the course's title. In fact, McCarthy reports that half the class
reported choosing "Philosophy and the Practice of Hope," because Fishman was
teaching it. McCarthy's classroom accounts make clear that he allows his students
to see a more mature and experienced person enthusiastically thinking about
something important. In fact, she describes his expression of genuine excitement.
"When he felt he understood something in new ways—that he or his students had
made new connections or found new 'harmonies,' to use a Deweyan word—Steven
became excited. He waved his arms, punched the air, and spoke animatedly in response to the pupil whose comment had provoked the insight" (110). Fishman's "aha"
moments may encourage students to think for themselves, discovering something
new to say. "I've noticed that he gets most excited when he hears something that he
hasn't heard before," a student reports, "especially when it's coming from one of us
. . . He also likes it when we see things for the first time" (110).
There is, however, something troubling in an approach to philosophy where
the emphasis is to emulate a thinker, rather than examine ideas critically. While
Dewey's place in the pantheon of American philosophers makes hero worship easy
for many of us, there is something to be gained from resisting the temptation to
venerate him. For example, I wish Fishman had pursued more fully his distinction
between what he calls the "familiar" and "unfamiliar" Deweys. I suspect Fishman
has come across Dewey's own failure to distinguish his more spiritual leanings
from his pragmatic ones.
All in all, I find more to praise than criticize in this book. Fishman, a professor who respects the power of ideas to transform lives, including his own and those
of his students, has much to share. McCarthy's work not only stands as a testament
to the power of a skilled classroom observer, but also demonstrates an effective and
comprehensive approach to conducting classroom research. Teachers interested in
developing a course around a single concept such as hope may also benefit from
reading this book. The appendix, containing Fishman's syllabus, guidelines, and
homework assignments, is especially complete. Students of Dewey's writings may
also enjoy Fishman's unique approach to constructing a theory of hope.
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